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Derrida’s Secret and Symptom:  
A Certain Impossible Possibility of Writing the Event1 
 
Kyle Kinaschuk 	  “There	  is,	  in	  every	  event,	  secret	  and	  symptomatology.”	  	  	  –	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “A	  Certain	  Impossible	  Possibility	  of	  Saying	  the	  Event”	  	  	  “Repetition	  and	  first	  time:	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  question	  of	  the	  event	  as	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ghost.”	  –	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  
	  	   Is	  it	  not	  questionable	  to	  begin	  with	  a	  question?	  	   In	  this	  paper,	  I	  attempt	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  event	  through	  Derrida’s	  late	  lecture	  “A	  Certain	  Impossible	  Possibility	  of	  Saying	  the	  Event,”2	   	  which	  he	  presented	  “spontaneously”	  at	   the	  Canadian	  Centre	  of	  Architecture	   in	  Montreal	  on	  April	  1st	  1997.	  Furthermore,	   I	  will	  analyze	   how	   a	   certain	   conception	   of	   the	   event	   emerges	   out	   of	   the	   conversations	   among	  Derrida,	  J.L.	  Austin,	  and	  John	  Searle,	  especially	  considering	  the	  text	  that	  “started”	  the	  much-­‐discussed	  debate	  between	  Derrida	  and	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	  speech	  act	   theorists:	  Austin’s	  
How	   to	   Do	   Things	   With	   Words.	   I	   will	   deploy	   Derrida’s	   “concepts”	   of	   iterability	   and	   the	  perverformative	   to	   think	   through	   the	  ways	   the	  event,	   if	   it	   can	  be	  written	   that	   it	   exists,	   is	  undoubtedly	  beyond	  the	  categories	  of	  the	  performative	  and	  constative;	  however,	  recourse	  to	   the	   many	   impossible-­‐possible	   aporias	   that	   populate	   Derrida’s	   late	   texts	   such	   as	   the	  decision,	  forgiveness,	  and	  invention	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  understand	  this	  difficult	  position.	  I	  will	   relate	   the	   symptom	   and	   the	   secret,	   then,	   to	   the	   event	   through	   an	   interrogation	   of	  “verticality”	   while	   analyzing	   the	   event’s	   capacity	   to	   disrupt	   established	   modalities	   of	  temporality.	  	  	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   to	  proceed	  by	  way	  of	   a	  question?	   This	  question	  before	   the	  question,	  which	   is	   a	   question	   that	   Derrida	   inherited	   from	   Heidegger,	   evokes	   some	   of	   the	   difficult	  problems	   to	   which	   Derrida	   always	   seemed	   to	   return:	   logocentrism,	   a	   “metaphysics	   of	  presence,”	   and	   onto-­‐theology	   to	   name	   a	   few.	   An	   evocation	   of	   the	   question	   before	   the	  question	  puts	   into	  question	   a	  perception	  of	   temporality	  and	  being	   that	   is	  grounded	   in	  an	  ontological	   economy	   of	   presence	   and	   is,	   therefore,	   inextricably	   bound	   to	   the	   Derridean	  quasi-­‐concepts	   of	   trace,	   archi-­‐writing,	   the	   supplement,	   the	   wholly	   other,	   and	   différance:	  “this	  trace	  being	  related	  no	  less	  to	  what	  is	  called	  the	  future	  than	  to	  what	  is	  called	  the	  past,	  and	  constituting	  what	  is	  called	  the	  present	  by	  means	  of	  this	  very	  relation	  to	  what	  it	  is	  not;	  what	   it	  absolutely	   is	  not,	  not	  even	  a	  past	  or	  a	   future	  as	  a	  modified	  present”	   (“Différance”	  13).	   Once	   we	   summon	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   question	   that	   precedes	   the	   question,	   both	   a	  revenant	  and	  a	  messiah	  emerge	  (the	  messiah	  of	  the	  messianic,	  or	  the	  messiah	  who	  never	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  doubly	  thank	  Ada	  Jaarsma	  for	  reviewing	  this	  paper	  with	  such	  care,	  attention,	  and	  thoughtfulness	  as	  well	  as	  the	  anonymous	  reviewer	  of	  this	  essay	  for	  their	  encouraging	  and	  insightful	  comments.	  Also,	  many	  thanks	  to	  Kaitlin	  Rothberger,	  Walter	  Reid,	  and	  Kirk	  Niergarth	  for	  commenting	  on	  earlier	  iterations	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  2.	  	  From	  this	  point	  on	  in	  the	  essay,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  essay	  as	  “A	  Certain	  Impossible	  Possibility”	  or	  “ACIP.”	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arrives).3	   	   Perhaps,	   we	   can	   preliminarily	   frame	   the	   event	   as	   a	   double	   session:	   the	  (im)possible	  and	  unforeseeable	  “moment”	  wherein	  a	  revenant	   inhabits	   its	  structure	   from	  within	  and	  a	  messiah	  falls	  vertically	  upon	  us.	  	  	   But	  we	  must	  not	  forget	  to	  emphasize	  the	  affirmation	  of	  a	  “yes”	  before	  the	  “yes”	  that	  is	  behind	  the	  question.	  The	  infamous	  “yes,	  yes”	  that	   is	  always	  a	  différant	  yes.	  Derrida,	   for	  example,	  writes,	  “we	  cannot	  say	  yes	  without	  promising	  to	  confirm	  it	  and	  to	  remember	  it,	  to	  keep	  it	  safe,	  countersigned	  to	  another	  yes;	  we	  cannot	  say	  yes	  without	  promise	  and	  memory,	  without	   the	   promise	   of	   memory”	   (“Ulysses	   Gramophone”	   596).4	   The	   second	   yes	   always	  beckons	   the	   first,	   but	   these	   yeses	   repeat	   themselves	   différantly,	   yet	   to	   pin	   down	   these	  irreducible	  differences	  with	  a	  master	  concept	  is	  questionable:	  “the	  trace	  is	  nothing,	  it	  is	  not	  an	   entity,	   it	   exceeds	   the	   question	   What	   is?	   and	   contingently	   makes	   it	   possible”	   (Of	  
Grammatology	  47).	  Here	  we	  can	  name	  the	  first	  pair	  of	  many	  aporias	  to	  come:	  the	  trace	  and	  différance.	   Both	   the	   trace	   and	   différance,	   although	   not	   usually	   characterized	   as	   aporias,	  constitute	   an	   impasse	   that	   escapes	  dialectical	   and	   rational	  movements,	   that	   is,	   they	  both	  conceptualize	  a	  “situation”	  that	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  through	  calculation	  or	  reason.	  The	  trace	  and	  différance,	  moreover,	   are	  not	  words	  or	   concepts	   (I	  will	   take	   the	   liberty	  of	   extending	  Derrida’s	  famous	  quotation	  that	  différance	  is	  “neither	  a	  word	  nor	  a	  concept”	  [“Différance”	  7]	   to	   the	   “quasi-­‐concept”	   of	   the	   trace);	   rather,	   they	  make	   words	   and	   concepts	   possible.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  trace	  and	  différance,	  of	  course,	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  master	  terms,	  as	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  a	  differential,	  double-­‐marking,	  which	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  arises	  out	  of	  Ferdinand	  de	  Saussure’s	  structural	  linguistics	  that	  posits	  the	  now	  infamous	  twofold	  thesis	  concerning	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   linguistic	   sign:	   the	   arbitrariness	   of	   the	   sign	   and	   the	  differential	  relation	  of	  language.5	  	  The	  trace	  and	  différance,	  moreover,	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  signs,	   since	   the	   trace	  writes	   to	   the	   residual	   play	   of	   differences	   (differing	   and	   deferring),	  which	   confounds	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   originary	   moment	   and	   undermines	   the	   metaphysical	  gesture	  of	  compartmentalizing	  presence	  and	  absence.	  There	  is	  always,	  then,	  the	  trace	  of	  an	  absent-­‐present	  other.	  Thus,	   the	  aporia	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  trace	  and	  différance	   are	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   signification,	   but	   are	   simultaneously	   the	  impossibility	   of	   naming	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   within	   an	   onto-­‐theological	   and	  originary	   field:	   “this	   unnameable	   is	   the	   play	   which	   makes	   possible	   nominal	   effects,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.	  	  One	  should,	  of	  course,	  mark	  the	  difference	  between	  messianicity	  and	  messianism.	  Put	  simply,	  messianism	  in	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian-­‐Islamic	  traditions	  calls	  for	  a	  messiah	  with	  particular	  characteristics	  who	  will	  arrive	  in	  a	  particular	  spatio-­‐temporal	  location,	  whereas	  the	  messianic,	  for	  Derrida,	  is	  a	  call	  for	  the	  other	  that	  is	  always	  deferred—to	  “come.”	  The	  messiah,	  in	  this	  case,	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  in	  advance,	  and	  thus	  never	  arrives:	  “this	  strange	  concept	  of	  messianism	  without	  content,	  of	  the	  messianic	  without	  messianism”	  (Specters	  of	  Marx	  82).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  messianic	  actively	  waits	  for	  the	  other,	  which	  subverts	  the	  categories	  of	  traditional	  and	  theological	  messianisms	  of	  the	  past,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	  other’s	  qualities	  and	  traits	  cannot	  be	  determined	  or	  anticipated;	  thus,	  the	  messianic	  is	  a	  “messianism	  without	  content.”	  	  4.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  no	  one	  understands	  the	  intersections	  of	  promise	  and	  memory—on	  the	  violence	  of	  rendering	  one	  calculable—more	  than	  Nietzsche:	  “the	  task	  of	  breeding	  an	  animal	  that	  is	  permitted	  to	  promise	  includes,	  as	  condition	  and	  preparation,	  the	  more	  specific	  task	  of	  first	  making	  man	  [sic]	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  necessary,	  uniform,	  like	  among	  like,	  regular,	  and	  accordingly	  predictable	  […]	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  custom	  and	  the	  social	  straightjacket	  man	  [sic]	  was	  made	  truly	  calculable”	  (36).	  	  5.	  Saussure	  on	  the	  arbitrary	  nature	  of	  the	  sign:	  “The	  bond	  between	  the	  signifier	  and	  the	  signified	  is	  arbitrary.	  Since	  I	  mean	  by	  sign	  the	  whole	  that	  results	  from	  the	  associating	  of	  the	  signifier	  with	  the	  signified,	  I	  can	  simply	  say:	  the	  linguistic	  sign	  is	  arbitrary	  (67).	  Saussure	  on	  the	  differential	  relation	  of	  the	  sign:	  	  “Within	  the	  same	  language,	  all	  words	  used	  to	  express	  related	  ideas	  limit	  each	  other	  reciprocally;	  synonyms	  like	  redouter	  ‘dread,’	  craindre	  ‘fear,’	  and	  avoir	  peur	  ‘be	  afraid’	  have	  value	  only	  through	  their	  opposition”	  (116).	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relatively	  unitary	  and	  atomic	  structures	  that	  are	  called	  names,	  the	  chains	  of	  substitution	  of	  names	  in	  which	  [...]	  the	  nominal	  effect	  différance	  is	  itself	  enmeshed,	  carried	  off,	  reinscribed,	  just	   as	   a	   false	   entry	   or	   a	   false	   exit	   is	   still	   part	   of	   the	   game,	   a	   function	   of	   the	   system”	  (“Différance”	  27).	  These	  quasi-­‐concepts	  are	  beyond	  their	  own	  possibilities.	  The	  event,	  I	  will	  contend,	   is	  also	  beyond	  its	  own	  possibility,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	  event	  surprises	  and	  tears	  the	  fabric	  of	  possibility,	  but	  I	  will	  refrain	  from	  discussing	  the	  event	  in	  any	  great	  detail,	  for	  a	  detour	  is	  necessary	  before	  we	  commence.	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  unveiling	  a	  thesis,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  carefully-­‐crafted	  
preface,	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  feigns	  the	  ability	  to	  present	  a	  cohesive	  truth	  in	  an	  unproblematic	  manner	   is	   antithetical	   to	   any	   rendering	   of	   the	   event,	   as	   the	   event	  must	   be	   singular	   and	  unanticipatable—beyond	   all	   calculation—and	   thence,	   the	   very	   logic	   of	   the	   text,	   if	   it	   is	   to	  constitute,	   “speak,”	   and	  address	   the	   (im)possibility	  of	  writing	   “the”	   event,	  must	   exceed	  a	  formulaic	   and	  mechanistic	   approach	   on	   the	   level	   of	   composition.	   It	  would,	   therefore,	   be	  unfaithful	   to	   the	   event	   if	   I	   were	   to	   read	   and	   relay	   the	   event	   with	   a	   calculative	  method;	  rather,	  I	  wish	  to	  position	  the	  event	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  both	  contamination	  and	  contingency,	  so	  I	  will	  refrain	  from	  giving	  an	  axiomatic	  “account”	  of	  the	  event.	  	  	   At	   this	   point,	   before	   we	   have	   considered	   the	   event,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   briefly	  acknowledge	   a	   certain	   difficulty	   that	   presents	   itself	   upon	   reading	   the	   “introductory”	  remarks	   of	  most	   of	  Derrida’s	   texts,	  which	   demonstrates	   the	   anxiety	   of	   effacing	   a	   certain	  understanding	   of	   the	   event	   through	   the	   act	   of	   summarizing	   the	   “key	   points”	   of	   an	   essay	  beforehand:	  	  	   the	  most	   consistently	   difficult	   sections	   of	   Derrida’s	   texts	   are	   his	  “prefatory”	   remarks	   […]	   his	   prefaces	   […]	   especially	   mark	   that	  which	   makes	   a	   text	   explode	   the	   classical	   ideas	   of	   truth	   and	  presence.	   And	   they	   must	   do	   so	   without	   letting	   the	   preface	  anticipate	  this	  “conclusion”	  as	  a	  single,	  clear,	  luminous	  truth.	  Thus	  the	   complication	   of	   these	   prefaces.	   One	   way	   of	   complicating	   a	  preface	  is	  to	  leave	  as	  a	  knot	  that	  which	  will	   later	  become	  several	  strands	  (“Force	  and	  Signification”	  TN	  3).	  	  It	  seems,	  then,	  that	  Derrida’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  nuances	  and	  complications	  of	  introducing,	  simplifying,	  and	  reducing	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  annulling	  the	  event	  through	  the	  act	  of	  anticipation.	  So	  I	  cannot	  “promise”	  where	  this	  text	  will	  ultimately	  lead	  if	  I	  desire	  to	  think	  meaningfully	  about	  the	  event.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  danger	  that	  arrives	  upon	  uttering	  the	  word	  “event,”	  since	   the	   event	   to	   an	   extent	   resists	   theorization:	   “that	   an	   event	   took	   place	   that	   cannot	  under	  any	  circumstance	  be	  reduced	  to	  its	  analysis,	  an	  event	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  any	  saying.	  It’s	  the	  unsayable:	  the	  dead,	  for	  example,	  the	  dead”	  (“ACIP”	  460).	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  though,	  that	  one	  cannot	  “say,”	  “make,”	  or	  “write”	  the	  event,	  nor	  does	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  event	  lead	  to	  negative	  theology,	  but	  I	  will	  leave	  these	  thoughts	  open	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  I	  would	   like	   to	  maintain,	   furthermore,	   that	   there	   is	   a	  way	   to	  write	   (im)possibly	   about	   the	  event,	  or	  why	  else	  would	  I	  take	  up	  the	  project	  of	  writing	  about	  the	  event?	  Nevertheless,	  we	  must	  take	  seriously	  Derrida’s	  advice	  that	  a	  promise	  is	  always	  a	  threat,	  so	  there	  is	  always	  a	  possibility	  that	  this	  promise,	  my	  promise,	  could	  fail,	  but	  to	  continue	  on	  in	  this	  way	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  event.	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Sealing the Event:  
Defeating the Performative and the Constative  
in the Name of Perverformativity  	   In	  the	  concluding	  paragraphs	  of	  “A	  Certain	  Impossible	  Possibility,”	  Derrida	  says	  that	  “a	  pure	  event,	  worthy	  of	  the	  name,	  defeats	  the	  performative	  as	  much	  as	  the	  constative.	  One	  day	  we’ll	  have	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  what	  this	  means”	  (460).	  In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  my	  concern	  will	  be	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  event	  to	  “defeat”	  both	  the	  constative	   and	   performative	   utterances;	   however,	   in	   order	   to	   take	   up	   Derrida’s	   claim	  sincerely,	   a	   solicitous	   reading	   of	   J.L	   Austin’s	   How	   to	   Do	   Things	   With	   Words	   must	   be	  undertaken.	  I	  will	  proceed	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  task	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  Austin,	  as	  is	  well	  known,	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  general	  categories	  of	  utterances	  in	   How	   to	   Do	   Things	   With	   Words:	   the	   constative	   and	   the	   performative.	   First,	   Austin	  describes	  constative	  utterances,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  best	  as	  statements	  that	  describe	  a	   state	   of	   the	   world	   through	   representation,	   and	   thus	   can	   be	   either	   true	   or	   false.	   The	  constative	   utterance,	   moreover,	   is	   an	   example	   par	   excellence	   of	   how	   language	   has	   been	  conceived	  by	  philosophers	  in	  the	  Western	  philosophical	  tradition.	  Second,	  the	  performative	  utterance,	  according	  to	  Austin,	  must	  satisfy	  the	  following	  conditions:	  	  	  a.	  they	  do	  not	  ‘describe’	  or	  ‘report’	  or	  constate	  anything	  at	  all,	  are	  not	  ‘true	  or	  false’;	  	  and	  b.	  the	  uttering	  of	  the	  sentence	  is,	  or	  is	  a	  part	  of,	  the	  doing	  of	  an	  action,	  which	  again	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  would	  normally	  be	  described	  as	  saying	  something	  (5).	  	  	  The	   performative	   utterance,	   then,	   can	   be	   neither	   true	   nor	   false	   and	   “allows	   us	   to	   do	  something	  by	  speech	  itself,”	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  act	  of	  speaking	  itself	  is	  transformative	  in	  one	  way	   or	   another,	   and	   therefore	   is	   not	   intelligible	   as	   either	   “true”	   or	   “false,”	   since	   the	  utterance	   itself	   is	   performing	   an	   action	   (“Signature	   Event	   Context”	   321).	   For	   instance,	  Austin	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  naming	  a	  ship	  to	  exemplify	  the	  performative	  utterance:	  “‘I	  name	  this	  ship	  the	  Queen	  Elizabeth’	  –	  as	  uttered	  when	  smashing	  the	  bottle	  against	  the	  stem”	  (5).	  It	  could	  be	  said,	  then,	  that,	  for	  Austin,	  the	  performative	  utterance	  is	  doing	  and	  performing	  something	  to	  the	  “world,”	  while	  the	  constative	  utterance	  merely	  reports	  and	  describes	  the	  “world”;	  nevertheless,	  both	  categories	  are	  still	  communicative,	  as	  Derrida	  points	  out:	  “this	  category	   of	   communication	   [the	   performative	   utterance]	   is	   relatively	   original.	   Austin’s	  notions	  of	  illocution	  and	  perlocution	  do	  not	  designate	  the	  transport	  or	  passage	  of	  a	  content	  of	  meaning,	  but	   in	  a	  way	  the	  communication	  of	  an	  original	  movement	  (to	  be	  defined	   in	  a	  
general	  theory	  of	  action),	  an	  operation,	  and	  the	  production	  of	  an	  effect”	  (“Signature	  Event	  Context”	   321).	   To	   use	   Austin’s	   example,	   when	   one	   says,	   “this	   ship	   is	   named	   the	   Queen	  
Elizabeth,”	  one	  is	  merely	  reporting	  the	  name	  of	  a	  ship;	  therefore,	  this	  could	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  constative	  utterance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  performative	  utterance	  such	  as	  “I	  name	  this	  ship	   the	   Queen	   Elizabeth”	   mobilizes	   language	   so	   that	   it	   does	   something,	   that	   is,	   the	  performative	   produces	   effects;	   namely,	   how	   we	   understand	   the	   ship	   in	   itself.	   On	   these	  grounds,	  the	  ship	  is	  now	  named	  the	  Queen	  Elizabeth.	  However,	  the	  performative	  utterance	  can	   fail,	   so	   there	  must	  be	  an	  appropriate	   “context”	   for	  a	  performative	  utterance	   to	   “fire.”	  i.e.,	   specific	   conditions	   have	   to	   be	   met	   for	   the	   ship	   to	   really	   take	   on	   the	   name	   Queen	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Elizabeth.	  Not	  everyone,	  for	  instance,	  is	  eligible	  to	  name	  the	  ship.	  We	  will	  explore	  the	  place	  of	  the	  performative	  in	  relation	  to	  context	  below.	  	  	   Once	  again,	  the	  performative	  utterance	  cannot	  be	  true	  or	  false.	  Austin	  circumvents	  the	   notion	   that	   performative	   utterances	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   either	   being	   true	   or	   false	  with	  the	  example	  of	  the	  promise:	  	  	   do	  we	  not	  actually,	  when	  such	  intention	  is	  absent,	  speak	  of	  a	  ‘false’	  promise?	  Yet	  so	  to	  speak	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  utterance	  ‘I	  promise	  that…’	  is	  false,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  though	  he	  [sic]	  states	  that	  he	  does,	  he	   doesn’t,	   or	   that	   though	   he	   describes	   he	   misdescribes	   –	  misreports.	   For	   he	   does	   promise:	   the	   promise	   here	   is	   not	   even	  
void,	   though	   it	   is	   given	   in	   bad	   faith.	   His	   utterance	   is	   perhaps	  misleading,	  probably	  deceitful	  and	  doubtless	  wrong,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  lie	  or	  a	  misstatement	  	  (11).	  	  The	  promise	  is	  undoubtedly	  still	  a	  promise	  even	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  insincere,	  viz.,	  I	  can	  promise	  that	  I	  will	  meet	  you	  tomorrow,	  and	  even	  if	  I	  do	  not	  show	  up	  tomorrow,	  then	  the	  promise	  is	  still	  a	  promise.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  utterance	  is	  neither	  “true”	  nor	  “false”	  like	  the	   constative	   variation	   of	   the	   sentence	   would	   be,	   e.g.,	   I	   promised	   you	   yesterday	   that	   I	  would	  be	  there.	  The	  foregoing	  example	  of	  the	  promise	  begs	  a	  qualification	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  performative	  utterance	  to	  “fire,”	  as	  many	  things	  can	  go	  wrong	  during	  the	  “firing”	  of	  the	  performative	  utterance,	  which	  invalidate	  the	  utterance,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  the	   utterance	   is	   “disallowed”	   or	   “botched.”	   Hence,	   the	   performative	   is	   “void	   or	   without	  effect”	  (Austin	  17).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  “failed”	  performative	  utterance	  can	  be	  “infelicitous”	  or	  “unhappy.”	   Austin	   formulates	   six,	   albeit	   tenuous,	   categories	   to	   classify	   “unhappy”	  utterances,	   which	   fall	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   “The	   Doctrine	   of	   the	   Infelicities.”	   Unhappy	  utterances,	   for	  Austin,	  have	  no	  effect.	  There	  are	  misfires	  (acts	  purported	  but	  void),	  which	  extend	   to	   misinvocations	   (acts	   disallowed	   (misapplications))	   and	   misexecutions	   (acts	  vitiated	  (flaws	  and	  hitches)),	  and	  abuses	  (acts	  professed	  but	  hollow	  (insincerities))	  (Austin	  11).	   Austin	   develops	   three	   subsequent	   terms	   for	   understanding	   speech	   acts:	   the	  locutionary	   act,	   the	   illocutionary	   act,	   and	   the	   perlocutionary	   act.	   Austin	   writes,	   “we	  distinguished	  the	  locutionary	  act	  (and	  within	  it	  the	  phonetic,	  the	  phatic,	  and	  the	  rhetic	  acts)	  which	  has	  a	  meaning;	  the	  illocutionary	  act	  which	  has	  a	  certain	   force	   in	  saying	  something;	  the	   perlocutionary	   act	   which	   is	   the	   achieving	   of	   certain	   by	   saying	   something”	   (121).	   In	  other	   words,	   the	   locutionary	   act	   is	   a	   statement’s	   ostensible	   meaning	   regarding	   its	  syntactical,	  grammatical,	  and	  semantic	  content,	  while	  the	  illocutionary	  act	  is	  the	  intended	  meaning	  (force)	  of	  the	  utterance.	  The	  perlocutionary	  act,	  simply	  enough,	  is	  the	  actual	  effect	  of	   the	   speech	  act	   regardless	  of	   the	  utterance’s	   illocutionary	   force.	  An	  unhappy	  utterance,	  according	  to	  Austin,	  will	  unquestionably	  yield	  an	  illocutionary	  force,	  but	  will	  not	  deliver	  the	  “intended”	  perlocutionary	  effect.	  	  	   In	  “Signature	  Event	  Context,”	  Derrida	  advances	  two	  critiques	  of	  Austin’s	  speech	  act	  theory	   as	   outlined	   in	   How	   to	   Do	   Things	   With	   Words.	   First,	   Derrida	   problematizes	   the	  demarcation	   between	   the	   performative	   and	   the	   constative.	   Second,	   Derrida	   undermines	  Austin’s	   privileging	   and	   separation	   of	   “serious”	   from	   “non-­‐serious”	   speech	   acts,	   i.e.,	   the	  “parasitic”	   and	   “abnormal”	   cases	   of	   language.	   The	   latter	   critique	   of	   Austin	   is	   beyond	   the	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scope	   of	   this	   essay,	   while	   the	   former	   is	   central	   for	   establishing	   Derrida’s	   claim	   that	   the	  event	  occurs,	  if	  it	  occurs	  at	  all,	  “outside”	  of	  performative	  and	  constative	  utterances.	  Derrida’s	   contention	   that	   Austin’s	   speech-­‐act	   theory	   presupposes	   an	   absolute	   and	  originary	  presence	  that	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  determine	  in	  advance	  the	  totality	  of	  context	  is	  at	  odds	   with	   the	   iterability	   of	   the	   sign:	   “every	   sign,	   linguistic	   or	   nonlinguistic,	   spoken	   or	  written	  […]	  as	  a	  small	  or	  large	  unity,	  can	  be	  cited,	  put	  between	  quotation	  marks;	  thereby	  it	  can	  break	  with	  every	  given	  context,	  and	  engender	  infinitely	  new	  contexts	  in	  an	  absolutely	  nonsaturable	  fashion”	  (“Signature	  Event	  Context”	  320).	  In	  a	  word,	  iterability,	  for	  Derrida,	  is	  the	  assertion	  that	  a	  sign	  is	  only	  possible	  because	  of	   its	  capacity	   to	  be	  reproduced,	  that	   is,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  sign	  is	  only	  intelligible	  if	  it	  is	  repeatable,	  quotable,	  and	  citable,	  which	  necessitates	   a	   fundamental	   absence	   from	  within	   the	   sign.	   An	   utterance’s	   perlocutionary	  force	   cannot	   be	   directed	   or	   calculated	   in	   advance,	   since	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   utterance	  hinges	  upon	  transgressing	  its	  own	  limit	  through	  a	  repetition	  of	  difference.	  The	  iterability	  of	  the	  sign,	  then,	  is	  caught	  in	  an	  aporetic	  movement	  wherein	  it	  is	  both	  impossible	  and	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  “sign”	  generalizable	  and	  unique.	  The	  question	  becomes:	  is	  this	  “sign”	  merely	  a	  repetition	  of	  the	  ideal	  “sign,”	  or	  is	  this	  “sign”	  a	  “sign”	  that	  is	  unique	  and	  singular	  in	  its	  own	  way?	  	  Iterability,	  moreover,	  opens	  up	  a	  space	  for	  difference	  to	  emerge,	  since	  a	  sign—and	  I	  mean	   “sign”	   in	   the	   broadest	   sense	   of	   the	   term—can	   enter	   a	   myriad	   of	   unanticipatable	  contexts	   and	   take	   on	   divergent	   meanings.	   Derrida	   observes,	   “Austin’s	   analyses	  permanently	  demand	  a	  value	  of	  context,	  and	  even	  of	  an	  exhaustively	  determinable	  context,	  whether	  de	   jure	  or	   teleologically;	   and	   the	   long	   list	  of	   “infelicities”	  of	   variable	   type	  which	  might	  affect	  the	  event	  of	  the	  performative	  always	  returns	  to	  an	  element	  of	  what	  Austin	  calls	  the	  total	  context”	  (“Signature	  Event	  Context”	  322).	  Austin’s	  project,	  for	  Derrida,	  is	  suspect	  for	  policing	  the	  context	  through	  an	  analytics	  of	  the	  utterance	  that	  outline	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	   performative	   utterance	   to	   fire	   felicitously.	   If	   the	   event	   is	   to	   be	   theorized	   as	   an	   event	  insofar	   as	   it	   is	   unforeseeable,	   this	   complete	   saturation	   of	   context	   has	   perilous	  consequences	  for	  the	  event,	  because	  if	  the	  event	  is	  dependent	  upon	  a	  certain	  impossibility	  of	   calculation,	   then	   the	   supposition	   of	   a	   stable	   ipseity	   that	   commands	   the	   performative	  utterance	   completely	   without	   hindrance	   prohibits	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   event,	   since	   the	  “pure”	   performative	   only	   takes	   place	   within	   a	   field	   of	   self-­‐presence	   and	   possibility.	   The	  event,	   on	   the	   contrary,	  demands	   the	   impossible.	  Austin’s	   attestations	  of	  what	   constitutes	  the	  “right”	  and	  “present”	  context	  is	  untenable	  once	  we	  view	  speech	  acts	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  iterability,	   for	   the	   illocutionary	   and	   perlocutionary	   forces	   of	   the	   utterance	   can	   never	   be	  completely	   known	   in	   advance.	   Absence	   is	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   sign.	   The	   “purity”	   of	   the	  speech-­‐act	   and	   the	   speaker’s	   assumed	   and	   “present”	   ability	   to	   govern	   meaning	   in	   a	  carefully	   controlled	   way—an	   assertion	   that	   denies	   dissemination—in	   Austin’s	   system	  collapses:	   “the	   conscious	   presence	   of	   the	   speakers	   or	   receivers	   who	   participate	   in	   the	  effecting	  of	  a	  performative,	   their	  conscious	  and	   intentional	  presence	   in	   the	   totality	  of	   the	  operation,	   implies	   teleologically	   that	   no	   remainder	   escapes	   the	   present	   totalization”	  (“Signature	  Event	  Context”	  328).	  Can	  a	  context	  ever	  be	   fully	  determined?	  Is	   it	  possible	  to	  claim	   that	   one	   can	   anticipate	   the	   contours	   of	   context?	   There	   is	   always	   a	   flickering	   of	   an	  absent-­‐presence	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	   addressee	   and	   the	   sender,	  which	  marks	   a	  dehiscence	  within	  the	  mark	  itself:	  a	  mark	  that	  absconds	  the	  determinable:	  “no	  context	  can	  enclose	  it.	  Nor	  can	  any	  code,	  the	  code	  of	  being	  here	  both	  the	  possibility	  and	  impossibility	  of	  writing,	  of	  its	   essential	   iterability	   (repetition/alterity)”	   (“Signature	   Event	   Context”	   317).	   In	   short,	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Austin’s	   account	   of	   the	   performative	   utterance	   leaves	   no	   room	   for	   the	   double	   play	  (differing	   and	   deferral)	   of	   différance.	   Let	   us	   remember,	   though,	   that	   the	   demarcations	  between	   the	  performative	  and	   the	   constative	  utterances	  are	  not	   as	  distinct	   and	  different	  from	   one	   another	   as	   the	   preceding	   definitions	   imply,	   of	   which	   Austin	   was	   cognizant;6	  however,	  this	  will	  become	  much	  clearer	  below.	  	  There	   is	   another	  point	   that	   is	   important	   to	  note	  with	   regard	   to	  Austin’s	   speech-­‐act	  theory,	  which	   is	   helpful	   for	   conceptualizing	   the	   event;	   namely,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  Austin	  isolates	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   the	   performative	   utterance	   to	   fire	   from	   its	  conditions	  of	  impossibility,	  e.g.,	  Austin’s	  “Doctrine	  of	  the	  Infelicities.”	  “Austin	  does	  not	  ask	  himself	  what	  consequences	  derive	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  possible—a	  possible	  risk—is	   always	   possible,”	   Derrida	   cautions,	   is	   somehow	   a	   necessary	   possibility.	   And	   if,	   such	   a	  necessary	   possibility	   of	   failure	   being	   granted,	   it	   still	   constitutes	   an	   accident.	   What	   is	   a	  success	   when	   the	   possibility	   of	   failure	   continues	   to	   constitute	   its	   structure?	   (“Signature	  Event	   Context”	   324).	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   actual	   structural	   possibility	   of	   the	   firing	   of	   the	  performative	  is	  its	  possible	  failure,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  pure	  performative	  utterance.	  Hence,	  the	  excluded—the	  possibility	  of	  the	  utterance’s	  failure—haunts	  the	  very	  act	   of	   firing.	   Austin’s	   “Doctrine	   of	   the	   Infelicities”	   is	   founded	   upon	   an	   exclusion,	   as	   the	  failure	   of	   the	   performative	   cannot	   be	   conflated	   with	   its	   very	   possibility,	   since	   the	  infelicitous	   performative	   is	   an	   aberration,	   a	   failed	   performative,	   and	   exists	   outside	   the	  category	  of	  the	  performative;	  thus,	  it	  is	  not	  constitutive	  of	  a	  “pure”	  or	  “ideal”	  performative.	  It	   could	   be	   said,	   then,	   that	   Austin	   is	   only	   concerned	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  performative’s	  failure	  externally,	  that	   is,	  as	  a	  threatening	  phenomenon	  that	  exists	  outside	  or	   before	   the	   utterance,	   whereas	   Derrida	   is	   speculating	   on	   the	   performative	   utterance’s	  possibility	   to	   (mis)fire	   from	   within	   its	   very	   structure.7	   For	   Derrida,	   the	   misfiring	   of	   a	  performative	  utterance	  is	  also	  its	  grounds	  for	  success,	   i.e.,	   the	  structural	  possibility	  of	  the	  firing	   of	   the	   performative	   will	   always	   be	   caught	   up	   with	   its	   possible	   failure,	   and	   the	  possibility	  of	   its	   failure	  haunts	   the	  very	  act	  of	   its	  ability	   to	   fire.	  There	   is	  always	  already	  a	  spectre,	   a	   possible-­‐impossible	   failure,	   because	   there	   needs	   to	   be	   an	   understanding	   of	  failure	  in	  order	  for	  one	  to	  conceptualize	  a	  success,	  so	  it	  could	  be	  written	  that	  failure	  does	  not	   exist	   on	   the	   outside,	   but	   on	   the	   inside.	   Although,	   it	   should	   be	   remembered	   that	   the	  “inside”	   and	   the	   “outside,”	   for	   Derrida,	   should	   also	   be	   troubled,	   so	   a	   simple	   division	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.	  	  Austin,	  for	  instance,	  writes,	  “	  Because	  we	  suggested	  that	  the	  performative	  is	  not	  altogether	  so	  obviously	  distinct	  from	  the	  constative—the	  former	  happy	  or	  unhappy,	  the	  latter	  true	  or	  false—we	  were	  considering	  how	  to	  define	  the	  performative	  more	  clearly”	  (67).	  See	  Shoshana	  Felman’s	  The	  Scandal	  of	  the	  Speaking	  Body:	  
Don	  Juan	  with	  Austin,	  or	  Seduction	  in	  Two	  Languages	  for	  an	  exciting	  exploration	  of	  these	  reflections.	  Felman	  illustrates	  the	  collapse	  between	  the	  constative	  and	  performative	  distinction	  when	  she	  writes,	  “But	  this	  criterion	  is	  insufficient,	  for	  we	  find	  other	  expressions	  that	  do	  not	  include	  an	  explicit	  performative	  verb	  and	  yet	  still	  belong	  to	  the	  category	  of	  the	  performative	  because	  they	  too	  accomplish	  an	  action	  and	  lie	  outside	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  truth/falsity	  criterion”	  (7).	  	  7.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  potential	  tension	  between	  Felman’s	  and	  Derrida’s	  respective	  readings	  of	  Austin.	  Felman	  compares	  Benveniste	  and	  Austin,	  “Now	  for	  Austin,	  the	  capacity	  for	  failure	  is	  situated	  not	  outside	  but	  
inside	  the	  performative,	  both	  as	  speech	  act	  and	  as	  theoretical	  instrument.	  Infelicity,	  or	  failure,	  is	  not	  for	  Austin	  an	  accident	  of	  the	  performative,	  it	  is	  inherent	  in	  it,	  essential	  to	  it”	  (45).	  These	  differences,	  nonetheless,	  cannot	  be	  elaborated	  upon	  here.	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between	  the	  two	  is	  not	  viable.8	  The	  performative,	  however,	  is	  perverse;	  thus,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  performative,	  but	  a	  perverformative.9	  	  	  Derrida	   asks	   the	   question:	   “would	   a	   performative	   utterance	   be	   possible	   if	   a	  citational	   doubling	   [doublure]	   did	   not	   come	   to	   split	   and	   dissociate	   from	   itself	   the	   pure	  singularity	   of	   the	   event?”	   (“Signature	   Event	   Context”	   328).	   The	   pure	   singularity	   of	   the	  event,	   perhaps,	   can	   be	   traced	   through	   to	   the	   final	   section	   of	   “Signature	   Event	   Context”	  wherein	  Derrida	  writes	  of	   the	   signature,	   as	   the	   signature,	   like	   the	  event,	   is	   caught	   in	   the	  interstices	   of	   both	   absence	   and	   presence	   and	   the	   general	   and	   the	   particular,	   for	   the	  signature	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  singularity,	  and	  maybe	  even	  an	  event,	  yet	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  because	  of	  a	   repetition	  of	  differences:	   “a	   truth	   that	   is	  nothing	  other	   than	   its	  own	   truth	  producing	  itself,	  this	  is	  indeed	  a	  unique	  event;	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  machine	  and	  a	  general	  truth”	  (“Psyche”	  216).	  The	  signature’s	  reproducibility—its	  inscription	  and	  seal—make	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  signature	  a	  possibility:	  “the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  these	  effects	  is	  simultaneously,	  once	  again,	   the	   condition	   of	   their	   impossibility[…]	   In	   order	   to	   function,	   that	   is,	   in	   order	   to	   be	  legible,	   a	   signature	   must	   have	   a	   repeatable,	   iterable,	   imitable	   form:	   it	   must	   be	   able	   to	  detach	   itself	   from	  the	  present	  and	  singular	   intention	  of	   its	  production”	   (“Signature	  Event	  Context”	  328).	  Many	  interesting	  and	  useful	  questions,	  I	  think,	  begin	  to	  take	  flight	  when	  we	  juxtapose	   the	   aporia	   of	   the	   signature	   and	   the	   possible	   impossibility	   of	   the	   event.	   Is	   the	  event	  contingent	  upon	  a	  series	  of	  citations,	   repetitions,	  and	   iterations?	  And	  can	  we	  write	  that	   the	  event	   is	   iterable?	  The	  event	   is	  certainly	  singular	  and	  unique,	  but	   is	   it	  possible	   to	  posit(ion)	   the	   event	   so	   	   it	   exceeds	   the	   repetitions	   that	   make	   the	   signature	   an	  (im)possibility?	   If	   we	   characterize	   the	   event	   as	   a	   moment	   that	   exceeds	   the	   trace	   and	  différance,	  then	  we	  risk	  thinking	  of	  the	  event	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  presence	  and	  transcendence,	  for	  the	  event,	  too,	  must	  be	  ruptured	  upon	  its	  own	  revealing.	  Derrida	  writes:	  	   I	  was	  saying	  before	  that	  the	  saying	  of	  the	  event	  presupposed	  some	  sort	  of	  inevitable	  neutralization	  of	  the	  event	  by	  its	  iterability,	  that	  saying	   always	   harbors	   the	   possibility	   of	   resaying.	   A	   word	   is	  comprehensible	   only	   because	   it	   can	   be	   repeated;	   whenever	   I	  speak,	   I’m	  using	   repeatable	  words	   and	  uniqueness	   is	   swept	   into	  this	   iterability.	  Similarly,	  the	  event	  cannot	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  event,	  when	   it	   appears,	   unless	   it	   is	   already	   repeatable	   in	   its	   very	  uniqueness.	  It	   is	  very	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  this	  idea	  of	  uniqueness	  as	  immediately	   iterable,	   of	   singularity	   as	   immediately	   engaged	   in	  substitution,	  as	  Levinas	  would	  say.	  Substitution	   is	  not	  simply	  the	  replacement	   of	   a	   replaceable	   uniqueness:	   substitution	   replaces	  the	  irreplaceable.	  The	  fact	  that,	  right	  away,	  from	  the	  very	  outset	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.	  Pheng	  Cheah	  expresses	  this	  well	  when	  he	  writes:	  	  Derrida	  warns	  us	  that	  this	  exteriority	  must	  not	  be	  thought	  in	  simple	  opposition	  to	  the	  inside.	  A	  simple	  outside	  is	  complicit	  with	  the	  inside…From	  a	  dialectical	  standpoint,	  the	  outside	  qua	  object	  is	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  inside	  qua	  subject.	  But	  it	  can	  be	  negated	  in	  turn	  when	  the	  outside	  is	  recognized	  by	  the	  subject	  as	  nothing	  other	  than	  itself	  thereby	  allowing	  it	  to	  return	  back	  to	  itself	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  reflective	  internalization.	  (74)	  9.	  	  Derrida	  introduces	  this	  neologism	  in	  The	  Post	  Card:	  From	  Socrates	  to	  Freud	  and	  Beyond:	  “Here	  is	  the	  master	  of	  the	  perverformative”	  (136).	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saying	  or	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  the	  event,	  there	  is	  iterability	  and	  return	   in	   absolute	   uniqueness	   and	   utter	   singularity,	   means	   that	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  arrivant—or	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  inaugural	  event—can	   only	   be	   greeted	   as	   a	   return,	   a	   coming	   back,	   a	   spectral	  
revenance	  	  (“ACIP”	  452).	  	  The	  event	  will	  be	  neutralized	  and	  effaced	  if	  it	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  pure	  presence	  that	  is	  not	  disrupted	  by	  both	  a	  trace	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  future	  iterations.	  The	  event,	  even	   though	   it	   is	   singular	   and	   unsubstitutable,	   is	   immediately	   ensnared	   in	   a	   space	   of	  replacement.	   The	   only	   way,	   for	   Derrida,	   to	   respond	   to	   this	   this	   spectral	   revenance—a	  Nietzschean	   return—can	   also	   be	   found	   in	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   perverformative	   wherein	   the	  possibility	  of	  the	  perverformative	  is	  always	  haunted	  by	  its	  failure:	  “my	  relationship	  to	  the	  event	  is	  such	  that	  in	  the	  experience	  that	  I	  have	  of	  the	  event,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  will	  have	  been	  impossible	   in	   its	   structure	  continues	   to	  haunt	   the	  possibility”	   (“ACIP”	  452).	  And	  here	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  make	  some	  more	  concrete	  connections.	  The	  problem	  that	  I	   identified	  earlier	  with	   Austin’s	   hypothetical	   speaker,	   regarding	   the	   pure	   presence	   of	   the	   “subject”	   who	  controls	   the	   context	   and	   excludes	   aberrations	   via	   the	   “Doctrine	   of	   the	   Infelicities”	  necessitates	   a	   smooth	   transitioning	   between	   the	   illocutionary	   and	   perlocutionary	  utterances.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   speaker’s	   intentions	   are	   immediately	   accessible	   and	  anticipatable,	   so	   the	   performative,	   if	   conceptualized	   in	   this	   way,	   leaves	   no	   room	   for	  contingency,	   since	   it	   depends	   on	   outcomes	  a	   priori,	   e.g.,	   the	   performative	   “I	   do”	   uttered	  during	  the	  wedding,	  if	  all	  conditions	  are	  met,	  will	  result	  in	  marriage.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  this	  was	  already	  calculated	  through	  a	  foreclosing	  of	  context,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  in	  no	  way	  constitutive	  of	  an	  event.	  	  If	   the	   event	   is	   indeterminable,	   then	   it	   cannot	   be	   performative,	   since	   the	   “pure”	  	  performative	   is	   a	   category	   of	   utterance	   that	   privileges	   and	   anticipates	   an	   outcome—the	  force	  of	  the	  speaker’s	   intended	  meaning	  yields	  specific	  effects	  that	  deny	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	   event,	   for	   the	   event	   cannot	   be	   calculated	   beforehand.	   Thus,	   the	   event,	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	  
worthy	   of	   the	   name,	  must	   bypass	   the	   categorical	   distinction	   of	   the	   performative	   and	   the	  constative.	  The	  constative,	  for	  obvious	  reasons,	  is	  not	  constitutive	  of	  the	  event	  because	  the	  constative	  utterance	  merely	  relays	  information	  and	  represents	  the	  “world.”	  Only	  the	  failed	  performative,	  the	  perverformative,	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  an	  event	  worthy	  of	  the	  name.	  To	  be	  specific,	  the	  event	  must	  defeat	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  performative	  and	  the	  constative.	  	  I	  have	  maintained	  Austin’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  performative	  and	  the	  constative	  to	   demonstrate	   that	   if	   one	   can	   predict	   formulaically	   the	   perlocutionary	   force	   of	   an	  utterance	   via	   the	   illocutionary	   utterance,	   then	   it	   is	   not,	   cannot,	   be	   named	   an	   event.	  However,	   if	   we	   take	   into	   account	   Derrida’s	   claims	   concerning	   context	   and	   iterability,	  especially	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  sign,	  for	  Derrida,	  cannot	  ever	  fully	  be	  saturated	  by	  a	  fixed	  meaning	  or	  context	  before	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  utterance,	  and	  the	  possible	  impossibility	  of	  the	  event	  with	  relation	  to	  a	  specific	  conception	  of	  the	  graphematic	  exceeds	  the	  presence	  of	   the	   sign,	   then	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   very	   threads	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   what	   is	  performative	   and	   constative,	   for	   Austin,	   fails.	   It	   is,	   we	   could	   say,	   infelicitous!	   Hence,	   it	  seems	  that	  every	  perverformative	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  yield	  an	  event,	  which	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  threat	   of	   failure—the	   absent-­‐presence	   that	   permeates	   and	   conditions	   signification	   from	  within	  its	  very	  structure—and	  is	  subsequently	  integral	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  event.	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Aporias: Taking A(c)count of the Event   
	  	   My	   concern	   in	   this	   section	   is	   to	   briefly	   illustrate	   some	   of	   possible-­‐impossible	  aporetic	   “events”	   that	   turn	   up	   throughout	   Derrida’s	   work;	   specifically,	   the	   decision,	  forgiveness,	   and	   invention.	   I	   intend	   to	   think	   through	   the	   deconstructive	   logic	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   aporias	   to	   avoid	   the	   ostensible	   privileging	   of	   the	   linguistic	   and	  semiological	   registers	   in	   the	   preceding	   section,	   even	   though	   the	   basic	   theoretical	  suppositions	   and	  movements	   of	   “the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   are	   also	   the	   conditions	   of	  impossibility”	  will	  be	  sustained.	  	  	  	   To	  begin	  with,	  the	  aporia	  is	  central	  to	  Derrida’s	  quasi-­‐transcendental	  philosophy.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  take	  the	  time	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  term	  quasi-­‐transcendental	  philosophy	  because,	  I	  think,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  understand	  this	  term	  in	  two	  ways.	  The	  term,	  on	  the	  surface,	  evokes	  other	   transcendental	   philosophies	   such	   as	   Immanuel	   Kant’s	   transcendental	   idealism	   and	  Gilles	   Deleuze’s	   transcendental	   empiricism;	   nevertheless,	   these	   three	   transcendental	  philosophies	  are	   irreconcilable.	   10	   	  Kant,	  however,	  uses	   the	   term	  transcendental	   in	  a	  very	  specific	   way,	   as	   he	   contrasts	   the	   transcendental	   with	   the	   transcendent.11	   For	   Kant,	   the	  transcendental	   is	   the	   underlying	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   experience	   and	   knowledge	  whereas	   the	   transcendent	   is	   beyond	  what	   one	   can	  know	  and	   experience.	   I	  would	   like	   to	  keep	  both	  terms	  as	  Kant	  used	  them	  intact.	  Derrida’s	  philosophy,	  perhaps,	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  both	   quasi-­‐transcendental	   and	   quasi-­‐transcendent.	   Length	   restrictions	   limit	   me	   from	  completely	  exploring	  these	  contentions;	  however,	  I	  will	  do	  my	  best	  to	  succinctly	  state	  the	  case	  in	  both	  instances.	  	  	   First,	   Derrida’s	   quasi-­‐transcendental	   philosophy	   works	   within	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	  while	  also	  seeking	  out	  the	  conditions	  of	   impossibility,	  so	   it	  could	  be	  said	  quite	  easily	   that	   Derrida	   always	   seems	   to	   reach	   an	   impasse	  where	   an	   aporia	   dawns	   that	   is	   at	  once	   impossible	   and	   possible.	   I	   will	   not	   expand	   upon	   this	   point,	   since	   it	   is	   generally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.	  See	  Gilles	  Deleuze’s	  “Immanence:	  A	  Life”	  for	  a	  clear	  explication	  of	  the	  term	  “transcendental	  empiricism.”	  Deleuze	  writes,	  “it	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  experience	  in	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  refer	  to	  an	  object	  or	  belong	  to	  a	  subject	  (empirical	  representation).	  It	  appears	  therefore	  as	  a	  pure	  stream	  of	  a-­‐subjective	  consciousness,	  a	  pre-­‐reflexive	  impersonal	  consciousness,	  a	  qualitative	  duration	  of	  consciousness	  without	  a	  self”	  (25).	  Also,	  see	  Claire	  Colebrook’s	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  for	  another	  helpful	  explanation	  of	  the	  term:	  “Philosophy	  can	  only	  be	  a	  
transcendental	  empiricism	  if	  it	  does	  not	  set	  up	  some	  foundation	  outside	  experience.	  Experience	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  on	  man,	  the	  subject,	  culture	  or	  language.	  There	  is	  just	  an	  immanent	  flow	  of	  experience	  from	  which	  distinct	  beings,	  such	  as	  human	  subjects	  are	  formed”	  (89).	  See,	  moreover,	  “The	  Transcendental	  Aesthetic”	  in	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  for	  Kant’s	  conceptualization	  of	  transcendental	  idealism.	  	  11.	  Kant	  notes:	  Hence,	  transcendental	  and	  transcendent	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  The	  principles	  of	  pure	  understanding	  we	  presented	  above	  should	  be	  only	  of	  empirical	  and	  not	  of	  transcendental	  use,	  i.e.,	  of	  a	  use	  that	  reaches	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  experience.	  But	  a	  principle	  that	  takes	  away	  these	  limits,	  which	  indeed	  bids	  us	  to	  overstep	  them,	  is	  called	  transcendent.	  If	  our	  critique	  can	  succeed	  in	  discovering	  the	  illusion	  in	  these	  supposed	  principles,	  then	  those	  principles	  that	  are	  of	  merely	  empirical	  use	  can	  be	  called,	  in	  opposition	  to	  them	  immanent	  principles	  of	  pure	  understanding.	  (386)	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accepted	   that	   Derrida’s	   work	   is	   quasi-­‐transcendental.12	   The	   case	   for	   the	   quasi-­‐transcendence	   in	   Derrida’s	   thought	   is,	   nevertheless,	   harder	   to	   argue.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	  messianic	   call	   of	   the	   to-­‐come	   fits	   the	   paradigm	   of	   what	   we	   might	   want	   to	   call	   quasi-­‐transcendence,	  since	  the	  messianic	  is	  a	  call	  for	  a	  messiah	  that	  will	  never	  arrive,	  and	  even	  if	  she	  were	  to	  arrive,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  ask:	  “when	  will	  you	  arrive?”	  Derrida’s	  messianic	  call	  is	   arguably	  quasi-­‐transcendent,	   as	   it	  defers	   the	  arrival	  of	   the	  messiah	  while	   situating	   the	  messiah	   in	   a	   space	   that	   is	   always	   to-­‐come.	  The	  messiah	   is	  not	   transcendent	   in	   the	   sense	  that	  she	  is	  completely	  beyond	  knowledge	  or	  experience	  like	  Kant	  claims,	  as	  the	  messianic	  call	   is	   both	   absent	   and	  present;	   rather,	   she	  opens	  up	   the	  possibility	   for	   a	   future	  without	  reserve	  or	  limit	  without	  elevating	  the	  messiah	  to	  a	  position	  of	  complete	  transcendence	  that	  would	  instantiate	  an	  onto-­‐teleo-­‐theology	  wherein	  a	  first	  cause,	  being,	  or	  telos	  is	  installed.	  	  	   The	  messianic,	  like	  the	  event,	  is	  always	  already	  open	  to	  the	  unanticipatable.	  Perhaps	  it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   Derrida’s	   quasi-­‐transcendence	   is	   the	   only	   way	   out	   of	   a	   certain	  Levinasian	  problem	  of	  the	  Other,	  which	  could	  be	  formulated	  as	  follows:	  if	  we	  conceptualize	  the	  Other	  from	  a	  space	  of	  radical	  alterity,	  then	  we	  are	  doing	  violence	  to	  the	  Other	  through	  omission,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  it	  is	  as	  if	  the	  Other	  has	  been	  effaced	  through	  negative	  theology.	  If	  we	  bring	  the	  Other	  into	  a	  discursive	  framework,	  however,	  then	  the	  Other	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  violence,	   for	   the	  Other	   is	  negated	   through	  a	   return	   to	   the	  Same.	  Simply	  put,	   the	  absolute	  alterity	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  effaced	  if	  one	  chooses	  to	  address	  the	  Other,	  or	  place	  the	  Other	  on	  the	  “outside.”13	  Derrida’s	  quasi-­‐transcendence,	   if	   it	   can	  be	   labelled	  as	   such,	  possibly	  obviates	  both	   of	   these	   problems,	   for	   it	   destabilizes	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   Other	   that	   is	   still	   wholly	  other—a	  radical	  alterity	  is	  upheld—while	  still	  writing	  of	  an	  affirmation	  that	  is	  foreign	  to	  all	  dialectics,	   a	   possibility	   of	   alterity	   without	   negation,	   an	   Other	   who	   defers	   sublation	  (Aufhebung),	  an	  Other	  without	  an	  onto-­‐theological	  return.	  I	  unfortunately	  do	  not	  have	  time	  to	  follow	  up	  on	  these	  tentative	  and	  digressive	  claims,	  but	  these	  questions	  will	  undoubtedly	  float	  around	  during	  the	  following	  discussion.14	  	   Derrida	  makes	  two	  elliptical	  references	  to	  the	  decision	  by	  way	  of	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  in	  two	  texts.	  First,	   the	  epigraph	  of	  Derrida’s	   famous	  essay	  on	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  History	  of	  
Madness	   entitled	   “Cogito	   and	   the	   History	   of	   Madness”	   begins	   with	   an	   epigraph	   on	   the	  decision:	   “The	   Instant	   of	   Decision	   is	   Madness”	   (32).	   Also,	   in	   The	   Gift	   of	   Death,	   Derrida	  evokes	  the	  same	  line:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.	  See	  Richard	  Rorty’s	  essay	  “Is	  Derrida	  a	  Quasi-­‐Transcendental	  Philosopher?”	  and	  Andrea	  Hurst’s	  essay	  “Derrida’s	  Quasi-­‐Transcendental	  Thinking”	  for	  critical	  inquiries	  into	  the	  status	  of	  Derrida	  as	  a	  “quasi-­‐transcendental”	  philosopher.	  	  13.	  	  See	  Derrida’s	  famous	  essay	  “Violence	  and	  Metaphysics”	  wherein	  he	  explicitly	  addresses	  Levinas’	  project.	  	  14.	  	  My	  argument	  that	  Derrida	  is	  a	  quasi-­‐transcendent	  philosopher	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Pheng	  Cheah’s	  recent	  reading	  of	  Derrida	  where	  he	  argues	  for	  a	  deconstructive	  materialism.	  This	  essay	  does	  not	  have	  the	  time	  or	  space	  to	  address	  this	  debate,	  but	  a	  quasi-­‐transcendent	  and	  a	  deconstructive	  materialist	  understanding	  of	  Derrida	  both	  attempt	  to	  wrest	  Derrida’s	  project	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  categories	  of	  idealism	  and	  materialism.	  To	  simplify,	  it	  all	  hinges	  on	  how	  one	  reads	  the	  word	  “alterity”	  in	  Derrida’s	  work.	  See	  Daniel	  Smith’s	  essay	  entitled	  “Deleuze	  and	  Derrida,	  Immanence	  and	  Transcendence:	  Two	  Directions	  in	  Recent	  French	  Thought,”	  which	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  Derrida’s	  thought	  and	  transcendence	  while	  also	  reflecting	  on	  the	  intersections	  of	  Derrida’s	  and	  Deleuze’s	  philosophies.	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I	   have	   underlined	   the	   word	   instant:	   “the	   instant	   of	   decision	   is	  madness,”	   Kierkegaard	   says	   elsewhere.	   The	   paradox	   cannot	   be	  grasped	  in	  time	  and	  through	  mediation,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  in	  language	  and	  through	  reason.	  Like	  the	  gift	  and	  “the	  gift	  of	  death,”	  it	  remains	  irreducible	   to	   presence	   or	   to	   presentation,	   it	   demands	   a	  temporality	  of	   the	   instant	  without	   ever	   constituting	  a	  present.	   It	  belongs	  to	  an	  atemporal	  temporality,	  to	  a	  duration	  that	  cannot	  be	  grasped:	   something	   one	   can	   neither	   stabilize,	   grasp	   [prendre],	  
apprehend,	  or	  comprehend.	  (66).	  	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   fascinating	   moments	   in	   the	   preceding	   passage.	   Notably,	   the	  evocation	  of	  an	  atemporal	  temporality	  squares	  with	  the	  aporetic	  impossible-­‐possibility	  of	  the	  event	  that	  exceeds	  “language”	  and	  “reason”,	  so	  the	  decision,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  decision,	  must	  break	   with	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   “reasonable,”	   because	   if	   one	   adheres	   to	   a	   set	   of	   outcomes,	  calculations,	  or	  precedents,	  then	  the	  decision	  is	  already	  predetermined,	  and	  therefore	  the	  decision	  has	  not	  taken	  place.	  Temporality,	  then,	  is	  suspended	  in	  this	  leap—this	  instant—of	  madness	  that	  is	  beyond	  knowledge.	  The	  decision	  like	  the	  event,	  then,	  contests	  modalities	  of	  temporality,	   as	   the	   decision	   does	   not	   take	   place	   within	   time—time	   is	   suspended,	  ungraspable,	  (im)possible.	  The	  possible	  becomes	  impossible,	  and	  the	  impossible	  becomes	  possible.	  	  	   Derrida	  makes	   a	   similar	   claim	   regarding	   the	   aporia	  of	   forgiveness:	   “forgiveness	   is	  not,	   it	   should	   not	   be,	   normal,	   normative,	   normalising.	   It	   should	   remain	   exceptional	   and	  extraordinary,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   impossible:	   as	   if	   it	   interrupted	   the	   ordinary	   course	   of	  historical	   temporality”	   (On	   Cosmopolitanism	   and	   Forgiveness	   32).	   Forgiveness,	   like	   the	  decision,	  arrests	   time.	  Forgiveness,	   of	   course,	   has	   not	   occurred	   if	   one	   forgives	  within	   an	  economy	  of	  calculation	  that	  weighs	  out	  what	  is	  forgivable	  and	  what	  is	  not.	  If	  the	  forgivable	  is	   already	   determinable	   in	   advance—if	   one	   can	   already	   forgive—then	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	  for	  forgiveness	  were	  already	  in	  place,	  which	  precludes	  forgiveness,	  so	  one	  must	  forgive	   the	   unforgivable,	  which	   requires	   one	   to	   disturb	   the	   course	   of	   historical	   time,	   for	  forgiveness	   must	   go	   beyond—exceed—the	   possible.	   Forgiveness	   is	   an	   impossible	  possibility.	  	  	   	  The	   third	   rupture	   concerns	   the	   aporia	   of	   invention:	   “indeed	   there	   will	   be	   no	  invention	  here	  today	  unless	  that	  break	  with	  convention,	  into	  impropriety,	  is	  made;	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  there	  will	  be	  invention	  only	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  invention	  transgress,	  in	  order	  to	   be	   inventive”	   (“Psyche”	   216).	   An	   invention	   is	   not	   an	   invention	   unless	   it	   goes	   beyond	  what	   is	   intelligible,	   that	   is,	   the	   invention	   must	   “transgress”	   current	   capacities	   and	  possibilities.	  If	  one	  “creates”	  what	  is	  already	  possible,	  then	  an	  invention	  has	  not	  occurred;	  nonetheless,	   the	  only	  way	   to	  place	   this	   conception	  of	   invention	   is	  outside	  of	   a	  dialectical	  movement,	  the	  Hegelian	  labour	  of	  preservation	  and	  negation	  wherein	  inventions	  are	  hailed	  back	  into	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Same.	  But	  does	  the	  invention	  have	  to	  become	  part	  of	  a	  discourse	  itself	   after	   its	   creation?	   The	   only	   way	   to	   answer	   this	   question,	   which	   is	   definitively	   a	  question	  of	  the	  event,	  is	  to	  return	  to	  the	  disruption	  of	  temporality.	  The	  decision,	  invention,	  and	   forgiveness,	   are	  all	   (im)possible	   events.	  They	  are	   instants	   that	   exceed,	  overflow,	   and	  rupture	  what	   is	   already	  possible:	   “one	  of	   the	   characteristics	  of	   the	  event	   is	   that	  not	  only	  does	   it	   come	   about	   as	   something	   unforeseeable,	   not	   only	   does	   it	   disrupt	   the	   ordinary	  course	   of	   history,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   absolutely	   singular”	   (“ACIP”	   446).	   The	   singularity	   of	   the	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event,	  however,	  is	  contaminated	  at	  the	  “origin,”	  for	  it	  beckons	  a	  return:	  “it	  must	  be	  a	  unique	  experience	   each	   and	   every	   time	   for	   it	   to	   be	   a	   unique,	   unpredictable,	   singular,	   and	  irreplaceable	  event.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  event	  must	  be	  presupposed,	  from	   the	   threshold	   of	   the	   house	   and	   from	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   irreplaceable”	   (“ACIP”	   453).	  This	  nondialectizable	  return	  is	  the	  inaugural	  possibility	  for	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  event,	  that	  is,	   an	   event	   that	   is,	   perhaps	   like	   the	   signature,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   impossibility	   of	  eventhood.	   The	   event,	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	  worthy	   of	   the	   name,	  must	   go	   beyond	   the	   limits	   of	   the	  constative	  and	  performative,	  the	  present	  and	  the	  absent,	  the	  general	  and	  the	  particular.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  event	  must	  remain	  unpredictable;	  therefore,	  the	  event	  exceeds	  a	  plane	  of	  horizontality	  and	  falls	  upon	  us	  vertically	  like	  a	  gift,	  because	  if	  I	  can	  already	  predict,	  or	  am	  prepared	   to	  host	   the	  event,	   then	   the	  event	  has	  not	  occurred:	   “it	  means	   that	   the	  event	   as	  event,	  as	  absolute	  surprise,	  must	  fall	  on	  me”	  (“ACIP”	  451).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  event’s	  possible	  impossibility	  is	  haunted	  by	  a	  spectre,	  as	  we	  saw	  with	  the	  perverformative,	  which	  constitutes	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   event	   from	   within.	   Consequently,	   the	   event	   is	   both	   a	  revenant	  and	  a	  messiah	  of	  messianicity.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  event	  is	  unforeseeable,	  absolutely	  singular,	  and	  destabilizes	  both	  temporality	  and	  historicity.	  
	  
The Event as Secret:  
Faith Beyond Knowledge 
	  I	   began	   this	   essay	   by	   gesturing	   toward	   a	   troubling	   question:	   is	  writing	   the	   event	  possible?	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  (im)possibility	  of	  writing	  the	  event	  will	  always	  be	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  nameable,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  the	  question	  never	  depends	  on	  the	  question	  as	  such,	  but	  what	  conditions	  are	  in	  place	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ask	  the	   question,	   i.e.,	   what	   are	   the	   spectral	   conditions	   that	   have	   been	   forgotten	   from	   the	  question,	  but	  are	  still	  integral	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  question	  (the	  yes	  that	  is	  in	  place	  before	  the	  yes).	  Second,	  there	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  naming,	  locating,	  and	  ontologizing	  these	  questions,	  these	  remains.	  However,	  these	  questions	  always	  operate	  on	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  possible	  and	  the	  impossible,	  the	  absent	  and	  the	  present,	  and	  the	  intelligible	  and	  the	  unintelligible.	  	  But,	  to	  be	  sure,	  I	  intend	  to	  keep	  my	  promise,	  so	  I	  will	  speak	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  writing	  the	  event,	  and	  then	  address	  the	  symptom	  and	  the	  secret,	  both	  of	  which	  my	  title	  promises,	  but	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  repressed.	  I	  am	  anticipating…calculating…	  	   In	   an	   early	   essay	   entitled	   “Force	   and	   Signification,”	   Derrida	  writes,	   “it	   is	   because	  writing	  is	  inaugural,	  in	  the	  freshest	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  that	  it	  is	  dangerous	  and	  anguishing.	  It	   does	   not	   know	   where	   it	   is	   going,	   no	   knowledge	   can	   keep	   it	   from	   the	   essential	  precipitation	  toward	  the	  meaning	  that	  it	  constitutes	  and	  that	  is,	  primarily,	  its	  future”	  (11).	  The	   force	   of	   writing—of	   the	   sign—to	   perforate	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   impossible	   is	   inscribed	  within	  its	  own	  possibility,	  as	  the	  danger	  and	  anguish	  of	  the	  glyph	  cannot	  be	  foreseen.	  I	  do	  not	   wish	   to	   belabour	   this	   point,	   but	   the	   word	   “knowledge”	   in	   the	   foregoing	   passage	  provokes	  the	  event.	  Perhaps	  this	  beyond	  knowledge	  even	  calls	  the	  event.	  We	  can	  stake	  two	  claims,	  then,	  of	  this	  writing	  of	  the	  event.	  First,	  writing	  is	  always	  necessarily	  beyond	  itself,	  as	  it	  is	  constituted	  by	  its	  (im)possible	  capacity	  to	  break	  with	  context,	  i.e.,	  iterability.	  	  Second,	  writing	  must	  surpass	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  calculable,	  for	  if	  we	  were	  able	  to	  impose	  a	  limit	  that	  would	  curb	  the	  dissemination	  of	  the	  word,	  then	  it	  would	  not	  be	  writing.	  This	  dialogue	  on	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the	  possible	  impossibility	  of	  writing	  the	  event,	  I	  think,	  brings	  us	  closer	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	   a	   pure	   event.	   Writing	   can	   only	   affirm	   difference	   and	   dissemination	   because	   it	   is	  repeatable,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  is	  ensnared	  in	  a	  general	  economy:	  “[the	  event]	  must	  be	  a	  unique	  experience	   each	   and	   every	   time	   for	   it	   to	   be	   unique,	   unpredictable,	   singular,	   and	  irreplaceable…But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  event	  must	  be	  presupposed	  from	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  house	  and	  from	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  irreplaceable”	  (“ACIP”	  453).	  Writing	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  calculable,	  but	  simultaneously	  suspends	  calculation.	  And,	  to	  be	  sure,	  there	  is	  an	  opening	  here	  between	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  event	  and	  the	  originary	  corruption	  of	  the	  event.	  We	  could,	  however,	  ask:	  does	  writing	  the	  event	  always	  come	  after	  the	  event?	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  write	  of	  the	  event	  requires	  that	  the	  event	  has	  already	  occurred;	  hence,	  one	  reflects	  upon	  the	  event	  from	  a	  distance,	  but	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  writing	  the	  event	  can	  spur	  on	  another	  event?	  Writing,	  like	  the	  event,	  breaches	  the	  limits	  of	  knowledge,	  so	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  writing	  open	  us	  up	  to	  the	  other	  whom	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  fully	  evoke?	  	   The	  answer	  to	  the	  preceding	  question,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  found,	  is	  definitely	  related	  to	  the	  secret	   of	   the	   event:	   “whenever	   the	   event	   resists	   being	   turned	   into	   information	   or	   into	   a	  theoretical	  utterance	  […]	  the	  secret	  is	  on	  the	  scene	  […]	  The	  secret	  belongs	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  event”	  (“ACIP”	  456).	  The	  secret	  is	  faith	  beyond	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  event’s	  possibility	  is	  grounded	  by	  an	  opening	  that	  can	  never	  be	  foreclosed.	  The	  event	  cannot	  be	  an	  event	  if	  the	  secret	  is	  not	  integral	  to	  its	  structure.	  The	  event	  has	  to	  be	  a	  surprise;	  thus,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  secret	   that	   exceeds	  knowledge,	   truth,	  discourse,	   time,	   and	  history	   for	   the	  event	   to	  occur,	  but	  the	  secret	  is	  never	  revealed	  upon	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  event,	  yet	  that	  is	  not	  to	  assert	  that	   the	   secret	   is	   “hidden.”	   Rather,	   the	   secret	   does	   not	   show	   its	   face	   (this	   is	   where	   the	  messianic,	  quasi-­‐transcedental	  aspect	  of	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  the	  event	  presents	  itself	  most	  obviously).	  There,	  moreover,	  is	  only	  a	  symptom—a	  symptomatology—which	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  the	  symptom	  of	  Freudo-­‐Lacanian	  discourses.	  The	  symptom,	  for	  Derrida,	  has	  never	  been	  repressed	  and	  is	  not	  expressed	  indirectly:	  “a	  symptom	  is	  something	  that	  falls.	  It	  is	  what	  befalls	  us.	  What	  falls	  vertically	  on	  us	  is	  what	  makes	  a	  symptom”	  (“ACIP”	  457).	  The	  symptom	   is	   similar	   to	   an	   (im)possible	   gift,	   which	   can	   only	   be	   recognized	   as	   a	   gift	   if	   it	  reaches	   past	   an	   economy	   of	   exchange	   that	   is	   devoid	   of	   rules	   and	   calculations,	   so	   the	  symptom	   is	   what	   arrives	   with	   the	   event	   and	   is	   coterminous	   with	   a	   certain	   Nietzchean	  perspectivism,	  as	  once	  there	  are	  axioms,	  codes,	  rules,	  and	  plans,	  then	  the	  event	  is	  no	  longer	  possible.	  The	  symptom,	  then	  “is	  a	  signification	  of	  the	  event	  over	  which	  nobody	  has	  control,	  that	  no	  consciousness,	  that	  no	  conscious	  subject	  can	  appropriate	  or	  control”	  (“ACIP”	  457).	  The	  decision,	  the	  gift,	  the	  event,	  invention,	  etc.	  always	  come	  from	  the	  other,	  for	  the	  other,	  and,	   like	   justice,	  do	  not	  wait,	   for	   the	  event	   is	  an	  arrival	   that	  one	  could	  never	  prepare	   for.	  And,	  perhaps	  here,	  beyond	  the	  dialectic,	  is	  where	  the	  difficult	  thinking	  begins.	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